Alternative Assurance Criteria

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Agenda

- Motivation
- Meta Criteria
- Common Criteria Interpretation
- Alternative Assurance Criteria Interpretation
- Conclusions
Motivation
Reported at recent ICCCs

- “Marketing is finding out what the customer wants”, Marketing panel (Tokyo)

- “After we have developed a product we employ a consultant to create the Common Criteria design documentation”, Microsoft (Tokyo and Berlin)

- There has to be a better way

  … and then I remembered
a long, long time ago...

- Before the first CESG evaluation facility (1986)
- Successful evaluations of UK government and banking IT systems
- High assurance gained through formal code analysis techniques (SPADE/MALPAS)
- Some work published but long since forgotten
- Approach abandoned in favour of quasi-harmonisation with Orange Book
Meta Criteria (pre 1986)

A piece of ancient history
Goals

“Correct operation confirmed or weaknesses and countermeasures identified”

In those days we spoke of software integrity (not security):

➢ *Software does what it is supposed to do and not what it is not supposed to do*”

Use precluded functions/properties (e.g. covert channels) as well as required functions/properties
Assurance

- Based on the extent of evaluator’s knowledge about the TOE
- Always used a model of the implementation as a means to reason about software integrity
- Always included testing (machine code verification regarded as impractical)
- Always checked quality controls (to ensure evaluating the right thing)
- Principle of escalation
  
  *Note: Orange Book also has some examples of this*
Meta Criteria

- Level of abstraction of the model
  - How far removed from the implementation

- Form of the abstraction
  - What does it allow the analyst to reason about
  - How does it allow the analyst to reason

- Means of model creation
  - Design intent or reverse engineering of the implementation
Creation of the model

- Two principal routes:
  - Implementation route (i.e. use the design documentation)
  - Analysis route (i.e. reverse engineer the models from the final implementation)

- Can be a mix

**KEY:**
- AC: Application concept (e.g. user requirement)
- FS: Formal specification (e.g. top level design)
- PFS: Partial formal specifications (i.e. intermediate representations)
- OS: Operational system (the actual resultant implementation)
- E: Environment
Common Criteria Interpretation
Basic thesis

- Use effectiveness criteria to reason about security
- Use design documentation for the models
- Use correctness criteria to argue that the models are a sufficiently correct representation of the implementation
EALs (V-model view)

Customer requirements
High level design
Low level design
Code

1. Acceptance testing
2. Integration testing
3. Module testing
4. Program testing
Example 1: GlobalPlatform

- Could have produced PP based on Visa Open Platform PP (OP3) – see ICCC2 (Brighton)
- But too many PPs (OP3, JavaCard, SCSUG, SSVG)
- Wanted something more intelligible
- Way ahead shown by ITRI – see ICCC3 (Ottawa)
- Result was the Card Security Requirements Specification – see www.globalplatform.org
Example 1: GlobalPlatform

- Semi-formal specification covering card content management down to and including the IC (physical)
- Addressed chip card “composition problem”
- Facilitated EAL6 evaluation (at least)
- But card vendors just go for EAL4+
Example 2: Microsoft’s SDL

- Focused on adding steps that reduce vulnerability rates during development
  - Engineer training
  - Threat modeling
  - Coding standards, code reviews
  - Use of static analysis tools
  - Fuzz testing
  - Independent “Final Security Reviews”

- Doesn’t map at all well to correctness requirements
- Evaluation documentation has to be specially produced after the fact
- Unnecessary expense

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Alternative Assurance Interpretation
The alternative

■ CC assurance uses models derived from design intent

■ Alternative: use models reverse engineered from the actual implementation (or a mix)

■ Note:
  - less expensive (no need for correctness criteria)
  - more reliable (based on the actual implementation)
  - Higher assurance (analysis will use formal code (logic) analysis methods)
Example 1: GlobalPlatform

- Proposition 1:
  - Animate the Card Security Requirements Specification and verify effectiveness
  - Use the results to generate tests
  - Use these tests to test the TOE

- Proposition 2:
  - As above, plus
  - Analyse reversed-engineered logic modules and confirm results with TOE-specific testing

- Note the GlobalPlatform Card Security Requirements Specification, animation and associated tests would be a reusable evaluation resource
Example 1: GlobalPlatform

Proposition 1:
- Animation and verification
- Derive test case
- Use these to show TOE meets security specification

Proposition 2:
- As 1 plus
- Analyse reverse-engineered logic modules
- Conform results with TOE-specific testing
Example 2: Microsoft’s SDL

Focused on adding steps that reduce vulnerability rates during development

- Engineer training
- Threat modeling
- Coding standards, code reviews
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1. (Semi) formal specification/architecture?
2. Could be used to create formal model of source code
3. Use spec/arch and code models to generate tests

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Example 2: Microsoft’s SDL

(1) Security Architecture, Attack Surface Review & Threat Modelling?

(2) Formal analysis of reverse engineered source code modules

(3) Fuzz testing, augmented with tests derived from (1) and (2)
Conclusions
Conclusions

- Our goal is to remove vulnerabilities
- Could create an alternative criteria based on meta-criteria
- Could be defined to yield an equivalence in terms of EAL
- Could never be created by incremental CC development
- More suited to actual development methodologies?
- Higher assurance for less cost?
- Would need to be driven by vendors
- Go for it?
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Any Questions?

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