Alternative Assurance Criteria

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Common Criteria

Agenda



- Motivation
- Meta Criteria
- Common Criteria Interpretation
- Alternative Assurance Criteria Interpretation
- Conclusions

Motivation

Reported at recent ICCCs

- "Marketing is finding out what the customer wants", *Marketing panel (Tokyo)*
- "After we have developed a product we employ a consultant to create the Common Criteria design documentation", *Microsoft (Tokyo and Berlin)*
- There has to be a better way

... and then I remembered

a long, long time ago…

- Before the first CESG evaluation facility (1986)
- Successful evaluations of UK government and banking IT systems
- High assurance gained through formal code analysis techniques (SPADE/MALPAS)
- Some work published but long since forgotten
- Approach abandoned in favour of quasi-harmonisation with Orange Book

Meta Criteria (pre 1986)

A piece of ancient history

Goals

- “Correct operation confirmed or weaknesses and countermeasures identified”
- In those days we spoke of software integrity (not security):
  - *Software does what it is supposed to do and <u>not what it is not supposed to do</u>”*
- Use precluded functions/properties (e.g. covert channels) as well as required functions/properties

Assurance

- Based on the extent of evaluator's knowledge about the TOE
- Always used a model of the implementation as a means to reason about software integrity
- Always included testing (machine code verification regarded as impractical)
- Always checked quality controls (to ensure evaluating the right thing)
- Principle of escalation
  - *Note: Orange Book also has some examples of this*

Meta Criteria

- Level of abstraction of the model
  - *How far removed from the implementation*
- Form of the abstraction
  - *What does it allow the analyst to reason about*
  - *How does it allow the analyst to reason*
- Means of model creation
  - *Design intent or reverse engineering of the implementation*

Creation of the model

- Two principal routes:
  - *Implementation route (i.e. use the design documentation)*
  - *Analysis route (i.e. reverse engineer the models from the final implementation)*
- Can be a mix



KEY:
AC: Application concept (e.g. user requirement)
FS: Formal specification (e.g. top level design)
PFS: Partial formal specifications (i.e. intermediate representations)
OS: Operational system (the actual resultant implementation)
E: Environment

Common Criteria

Common Criteria Interpretation

Basic thesis

- Use effectiveness criteria to reason about security
- Use design documentation for the models
- Use correctness criteria to argue that the models are a sufficiently correct representation of the implementation

EALs (V-model view)



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Example 1: GlobalPlatform

- Could have produced PP based on Visa Open Platform PP (OP3) – see ICCC2 (Brighton)
- But too many PPs (OP3, JavaCard, SCSUG, SSVG)
- Wanted something more intelligible
- Way ahead shown by ITRI – see ICCC3 (Ottawa)
- Result was the Card Security Requirements Specification – see www.globalplatform.org



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Example 1: GlobalPlatform

- Semi-formal specification covering card content management down to and including the IC (physical)
- Addressed chip card “composition problem”
- Facilitated EAL6 evaluation (at least)
- But card vendors just go for EAL4+



Example 2: Microsoft's SDL

- **Focused on adding steps that reduce vulnerability rates during development**
  - **Engineer training**
  - **Threat modeling**
  - **Coding standards, code reviews**
  - **Use of static analysis tools**
  - **Fuzz testing**
  - **Independent "Final Security Reviews"**

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- Doesn't map at all well to correctness requirements
- Evaluation documentation has to be specially produced after the fact
- Unnecessary expense

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Alternative Assurance Interpretation

The alternative

- CC assurance uses models derived from design intent

- Alternative: use models reverse engineered from the actual implementation (or a mix)

- Note:
  - *less expensive (no need for correctness criteria)*
  - *more reliable (based on the actual implementation)*
  - *Higher assurance (analysis will use formal code (logic) analysis methods)*

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Example 1: GlobalPlatform

- Proposition 1:
  - *Animate the Card Security Requirements Specification and verify effectiveness*
  - *Use the results to generate tests*
  - *Use these tests to test the TOE*



- Proposition 2:
  - *As above, plus*
  - *Analyse reversed-engineered logic modules and confirm results with TOE-specific testing*

- Note the GlobalPlatform Card Security Requirements Specification, animation and associated tests would be a **reusable** evaluation resource

Example 1: GlobalPlatform

Proposition 1:

- Animation and verification
- Derive test case
- Use these to show TOE meets security specification

Proposition 2:

- As 1 plus
- Analyse reverse-engineered logic modules
- Conform results with TOE-specific testing

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Example 2: Microsoft’s SDL

- Focused on adding steps that reduce vulnerability rates during development
  - Engineer training
  - Threat modeling
  - Coding standards, code reviews
  - Use of static analysis tools
  - Fuzz testing
  - Independent “Final Security Reviews”

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1. (Semi) formal specification/ architecture?
2. Could be used to create formal model of source code
3. Use spec/arch and code models to generate tests

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Example 2: Microsoft's SDL

(1) Security Architecture, Attack Surface Review & Threat Modelling?



(3) Fuzz testing, augmented with tests derived from (1) and (2)

(2) Formal analysis of reverse engineered source code modules

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Conclusions

Conclusions

- Our goal is to remove vulnerabilities
- Could create an alternative criteria based on meta-criteria
- Could be defined to yield an equivalence in terms of EAL
- Could never be created by incremental CC development
- More suited to actual development methodologies?
- Higher assurance for less cost?
- Would need to be driven by vendors
- Go for it?

Alternative Assurance Criteria

Any Questions?

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